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BROWN, HISTORY, AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
Christopher W. Schmidt*
The legislative history of [the Fourteenth] Amendment is not enlightening,
and the history of its ratification is not edifying.
—Justice Robert H. Jackson (1955)1
The Fourteenth Amendment was actually the culmination of the determined
efforts of the Radical Republican majority in Congress to incorporate into
our fundamental law the well-defined equalitarian principle of complete
equality for all without regard to race or color. The debates in the 39th
Congress and succeeding Congresses clearly reveal the intention that the
Fourteenth Amendment would work a revolutionary change in our statefederal relationship by denying to the states the power to distinguish on the
basis of race.
—NAACP Brief on Reargument in Brown v. Board of Education (1953)2
Legal scholars and historians in recent years have sought to elevate
Reconstruction to the stature of a “second Founding,” according it the same careful
inquiry and legitimating function as the first. Their work marks the latest iteration of
a decades-long campaign to displace the far more dismissive attitude toward
Reconstruction that permeated historical scholarship and legal opinions in the first half
of the twentieth century. In this Article, I present the flurry of engagement with the
history of the Fourteenth Amendment during the litigation of Brown v. Board of
Education (1954) as a key transition point in how historians and legal scholars have
© 2022 Christopher W. Schmidt. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law and Co-Director, Institute on the Supreme Court of the United
States (ISCOTUS), Chicago-Kent College of Law; Research Professor, American Bar
Foundation. I would like to thank the organizers of the Conference on Constitutional
Reconstruction at the University of Notre Dame for the occasion to write this Article and
my fellow conference participants for their part in making it better.
1 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT 68 (1955).
2 Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and for Respondents in No. 10 on
Reargument at 17–18, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 1, 2, 4, 10), 1953
WL 78288 [hereinafter NAACP Brief].
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approached the constitutional history of Reconstruction. I highlight in particular the
efforts of the lawyers for the NAACP, who advocated a reading of the Equal Protection
Clause that most scholars at the time believed conflicted with the Fourteenth
Amendment’s original meaning. With the aid of a group of historians sympathetic to
their cause, the NAACP lawyers prepared a brief that presented a bold (if often
tendentious) revisionist history of the Fourteenth Amendment that advanced an
originalist justification for striking down segregation laws. The Supreme Court did
not accept the NAACP’s reading of history; in his Brown opinion, Chief Justice Earl
Warren concluded the historical record was “inconclusive” on the question of school
segregation. Yet the basic assumption about Reconstruction history on which the
NAACP legal brief turned—that the aspirations of the most egalitarian voices of the
day deserve special weight in assessing the meaning of the Reconstruction
amendments—has today become a core tenet of legal and historical scholarship.

This Article considers how scholars and jurists have approached
the history of the framing and ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. I use as a centerpiece of my inquiry the Supreme Court’s
confrontation with the Fourteenth Amendment’s history in Brown v.
Board of Education.3 Although Chief Justice Earl Warren’s Brown
opinion conspicuously sidesteps this history—he deemed the historical
record “inconclusive” with regard to the issue of racial segregation in
public schools4 and cautioned against “turn[ing] the clock back to
1868”5—the lawyers and the Justices who contributed to this selfconsciously ahistorical opinion spent a great deal of time with their
clocks turned back to the 1860s. At one point in the litigation, the
Supreme Court told the lawyers to reargue the case with a focus on the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 This produced
what was at the time, according to Alexander Bickel, Justice Felix
Frankfurter’s clerk for the 1952–53 term, “the most extensive
presentation of historical materials ever made to the Court.”7
I consider in this Article the various historical research projects
initiated in response to the Court’s reargument order. I give particular
focus to that of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
whose lawyers confronted a historical record that most people at the
time believed stood in clear opposition to their argument that the
Fourteenth Amendment should be read to prohibit state-mandated
racial segregation. I also consider why the Justices, when it came time
to write the Brown opinion, turned away from this history.
My examination of the history of Brown provides a starting point
for a more general consideration of how different generations of
3
4
5
6
7

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 489.
Id. at 492–93.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1955).
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scholars and jurists have approached the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Brown story showcases two basic approaches to that history—what
I label Fourteenth Amendment pessimism and Fourteenth Amendment optimism. At the time of Brown, the pessimistic view dominated
popular memory, historical scholarship, and the legal academy. It was
premised on the view that the framing and ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment was not a particularly admirable moment in
American history. The protagonists in this history were flawed figures
who were moved not only by moral fervor but also by self-interest and
vindictiveness. Their imprecise and inconsistent descriptions of the
constitutional transformations they championed left behind for future
generations more rhetoric than insight. Accepting this pessimistic
perspective, the Brown Court treated the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment as an obstacle to be pushed aside—a path that most
supporters of the Court’s ruling praised as necessary and wise.
The NAACP lawyers charted an alternate path, finding in the
history of the Fourteenth Amendment a story of vision and heroism.
Expanding on the work of a small group of scholars who had
pioneered this optimistic approach in the decades preceding Brown,
the NAACP portrayed the Radical Republicans who led the drive for
Amendment as men of principle with an “almost fanatic devotion” to
the egalitarian ideals of the Declaration of Independence.8 The
Amendment was “the legal capstone of the revolutionary drive of the
Abolitionists to reach the goal of true equality.”9 Many at the time—
including some of the historians who helped the NAACP lawyers
research their brief and the Supreme Court Justices who ordered the
brief—dismissed the NAACP’s brief as well-meaning but suspect as an
effort of historical interpretation. Yet the confident Fourteenth
Amendment optimism the NAACP articulated would echo in the work
of future generations of historians and legal scholars.
The prevailing account of Reconstruction today resembles the
NAACP’s portrait far more than the pessimistic account that dominated at the time of Brown. Historians have tempered the more
tendentious of the NAACP’s claims about the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. They have also expanded the cast of primary
actors beyond the white radical abolitionists who dominated the
NAACP’s narrative. But the celebratory, even reverential attitude
toward the constitutional project of Reconstruction that the NAACP
brief advanced is now embraced by scholars and lawyers across the
ideological spectrum. In recent years, originalist scholars, critics of
originalism, and historians have all engaged in efforts to elevate

8
9

NAACP Brief, supra note 2, at 69.
Id.
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Reconstruction to the stature of a “second Founding,” accorded the
same careful inquiry, legitimating status, and appreciation as the first.10
I consider the significance of this development for present-day efforts
to interpret the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
BROWN AND THE HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION
At the time of Brown, most assumed that the weight of history went
against the cause of civil rights. Segregationists routinely called upon
history to defend against what they saw as the integrationists’
dangerous challenge to the racial status quo. And even those with
some degree of sympathy for the cause of racial equality generally saw
the experience of Reconstruction, the most relevant potential model
for racial reform in the mid-twentieth century, as a warning against
precipitous social reform.
The Justices of the Brown Court embraced, for the most part, the
prevailing assumption in mainstream society that Reconstruction was
an unfortunate and embarrassing episode of American history. Those
Justices who expressed the most interest in bringing the historical
record into constitutional analysis were often the most critical of the
quality and value of that record when it came to Reconstruction. They
generally accepted the premises of the Dunning School of Reconstruction history that dominated the first half of the twentieth century and
presented Reconstruction as a lamentable example of misguided
federal intervention into the South and political empowerment of
African Americans.11 In a 1945 dissent, Justice Felix Frankfurter described the landmark civil rights legislation of the period as “born of
that vengeful spirit which to no small degree envenomed the
10 Just a decade ago, Jamal Greene observed that “[j]udges, scholars, and ordinary
citizens writing or speaking in the originalist tradition consistently ignore the original
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment
Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 979 (2012). This is no longer true. See, e.g., 1 THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS: THE ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS (Kurt T. Lash ed., 2021); 2
THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS: THE ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS (Kurt T. Lash ed.,
2021); RANDY E. BARNETT & EVAN D. BERNICK, THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: ITS LETTER AND SPIRIT (2021); CHRISTOPHER R. GREEN, EQUAL
CITIZENSHIP, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE ORIGINAL SENSE OF THE
PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE (2015); KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2014).
In recent years, two scholars of quite different ideological persuasions published
books titled “The Second Founding.” ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL
WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE CONSTITUTION (2019); ILAN WURMAN, THE
SECOND FOUNDING: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2020).
11 See, e.g., FONER, supra note 10, at xxi–xxiv. For a descriptive background of the
Dunning School, see LAURA F. EDWARDS, A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION: A NATION OF RIGHTS 7 (2015).
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Reconstruction era.”12 Claude Bowers’s The Tragic Era (1929), one of
the most widely read texts of the Dunning School, was praised by
Justice Hugo Black13 and cited by Justice Robert H. Jackson in a 1951
opinion.14 In his unpublished concurring opinion in Brown, Justice
Jackson declared Reconstruction “a passionate, confused and
deplorable era.”15
Despite the Justice’s expressed distaste for the history of
Reconstruction—a sentiment leading constitutional scholars of the
day regularly echoed16—the Court could not avoid engaging, to some
degree, with the history of the Fourteenth Amendment when they
considered whether that amendment prohibited state-mandated racial
segregation in public schools. In Plessy v. Ferguson,17 the ruling that the
Court had to effectively overrule in order to strike down segregation
in schools, the Court had relied on a claim about the framing of the
Fourteenth Amendment to justify its decision upholding state
segregation statutes. “The object of the amendment was undoubtedly
to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law,” Justice
Henry B. Brown observed, “but in the nature of things it could not
have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to
enforce social, as distinguished from political[,] equality, or a
commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.”18
It was hard to see how the Justices could avoid coming to terms with
the history of the Fourteenth Amendment in their challenge to Plessy.

12 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 140 (1945) (Roberts, Frankfurter & Jackson,
JJ., dissenting).
13 ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 143 (2d ed. 1997).
14 Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 657 n.8 (1951).
15 Unpublished Opinion of Robert H. Jackson in Brown v. Board (Mar. 15, 1954), in
DAVID M. O’BRIEN, JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON’S UNPUBLISHED OPINION IN BROWN V.
BOARD 123, 125 (2017).
16 Thomas Reed Powell, in the process of defending late-nineteenth-century Court’s
rulings striking down Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes, referred to the work of Radical
Reconstruction as an “orgy.” Thomas Reed Powell, Judicial Protection of Civil Rights, 29 IOWA
L. REV. 383, 386 n.13 (1944). Charles Fairman wrote in a 1948 edition of his casebook that
Reconstruction was characterized by leadership and supporters who were “weak,
inexperienced, often corrupt.” Richard L. Aynes, Charles Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1197, 1204 n.42 (1995) (quoting CHARLES
FAIRMAN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS 308 (1948)). Fairman (a frequent
correspondent of Justice Frankfurter) also criticized the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment for their “hazy” thinking. See Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights?: The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 138–39 (1949).
Fairman’s bias against Reconstruction is discussed in AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 181–214, 303 (1998); Aynes, supra, at 1204 n.42,
1231–1233.
17 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
18 Id. at 544.
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Events particular to Brown dramatically heightened attention to
the historical record. After first hearing oral arguments for Brown in
the fall of 1952, the Justices remained divided. There was probably
majority support for the NAACP’s position that segregated schools
were unconstitutional, yet by the spring of 1953 that majority appeared
slim. Justice Frankfurter particularly feared a sharply divided decision
on this momentous issue, and he devised a plan to delay resolution of
the case by asking the litigants to give a new round of arguments the
following Term.19 He suggested to his colleagues that they request
reargument based on a series of questions they would pose to the
opposing sides (and they would ask the Justice Department to
participate again).20
Justice Frankfurter’s unusual21 proposal was not embraced by all
the Justices. Justice Hugo Black, with Justice Douglas’s support,
objected in particular to the content of the questions. Black
approached the history at a high level of abstraction and had little
doubt that a desegregationist reading of the Fourteenth Amendment
could be justified on originalist grounds.22 He feared the proposed
19 Scholars and interested observers have debated Justice Frankfurter’s motivations in
seeking to delay ruling on Brown. His supporters argue that he sought to solidify a strong
majority in favor of overruling Plessy. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE
HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY
596–602 (1976); Philip Elman, The Solicitor General’s Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights
Litigation, 1946–1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 823 (1987). His critics
counter that he needed time to rationalize his own support for the decision. See, e.g., Mark
Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 1867, 1906, 1929 (1991); see also Memorandum by William O. Douglas, Assoc. J.,
U.S. Sup. Ct. (May 17, 1954) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review from the William O.
Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, Container 1149) (stating that Frankfurter was not
prepared to overrule Plessy in either the 1952 or 1953 conferences).
20 Drafts of Justice Frankfurter’s questions are found in Felix Frankfurter’s Papers.
Draft Questions for Brown Argument (June 4, 1953) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review
from the Harvard Law School’s Modern Manuscripts Collection, Felix Frankfurter Papers
[hereinafter FFP-HLS], Part II, Reel 4, Frames 219–23). Justice Frankfurter drafted the
questions with the assistance of his clerk, Alexander Bickel. Interview by Richard Kluger
with Alexander Bickel, Professor of Law, Yale Univ., in New Haven, Conn. (Aug. 20, 1971),
at 3 (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review from Yale University Library, Brown v. Board of
Education Collection [hereinafter Brown v. Board of Education Collection], Series 1, Box 1,
Folder 4) [hereinafter Bickel Interview].
21 “[O]ne wonders whether, in asking Negro counsel to search for and present
evidence of framer-intent on this specific issue of school segregation the Court remembered
that no such request ever had been made—or ever could have been made—with regard to
countless matters and fields over which it previously had extended the Amendment’s
protection.” Howard Jay Graham, The Fourteenth Amendment and School Segregation, 3 BUFF.
L. REV. 1, 6 (1953).
22 Justice Black expressed his views at the December 1952 Brown conference. THE
SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985), at 648 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) [hereinafter
IN CONFERENCE]. Justice Black asserted his support for a desegregation decision and
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reargument order “would bring floods of historical contentions on the
specific points we asked about which would dilute the arguments along
broader lines. I doubt if it would be possible to isolate framers’ views
about segregation in the primary schools.”23 The other Justices disagreed. They welcomed the prospect of additional time to work out
this volatile issue and gave their support to Justice Frankfurter’s
proposal.24
The reargument order listed five questions for the attorneys to
consider in their briefs and oral arguments scheduled for the following
fall.25 The first question asked whether either the Congress that
drafted the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 or the states that then
ratified it intended to outlaw segregation in the schools. The second
question asked whether, assuming the research into question one
revealed that the original intention of the Amendment was not the
immediate abolition of school segregation, the Framers intended for
the Amendment to grant either Congress or the courts the power to
end school segregation at some later date. The third asked whether,
in the absence of clear guidance from history, the Court had the power
to abolish segregated schools. And the final two questions concerned
the issue of possible implementation of a desegregation decision. The
result of the first two questions was to bring history to a new level of
prominence in the legal battle against segregated schooling.26
The order for reargument spawned four separate projects of
historical investigation and interpretation. The NAACP lawyers embarked on the most ambitious research agenda, contacting for
guidance numerous professional historians, enlisting some to pursue
research on specific topics, and convening a conference to bring
together the lawyers and historians. They produced a lengthy brief
argued that the basic purpose of the Reconstruction Amendments was to abolish caste
distinctions and discrimination on account of color. Id.
Justice Black would publicly declare his originalist defense of Brown years later in
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 677 n.7 (1966) (“In my judgment the
holding in Brown against racial discrimination was compelled by the purpose of the Framers
of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments completely to outlaw
discrimination against people because of their race or color.”).
23 NEWMAN, supra note 13, at 433.
24 Id.
25 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953) (ordering reargument).
26 One of Justice Frankfurter’s goals in drafting the reargument order was to avoid
the appearance of favoring either party. The challenges of implementation, not the history
of Reconstruction, was what most interested the Justices. But the historical questions were
needed to avoid the appearance of siding with the NAACP. As Justice Frankfurter put it,
“By looking in opposite directions the questions would not tip the mitt.” Letter from Felix
Frankfurter, Assoc. J., U.S. Sup. Ct., to Fred Vinson, C.J., U.S. Sup. Ct. (June 8, 1953) (on
file with the Notre Dame Law Review from FFP-HLS, supra note 20, at Part I, Reel 4, Frame
237).
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arguing that the preponderance of the historical material supported
their argument that segregation violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.27 The lawyers for the states that were
defending their segregation statutes were confident that the historical
record would vindicate their position.28 They conducted a more
modest research project than that of the NAACP, keeping the work
largely in-house and eventually drafting a summary of the original
intentions of the Framers and drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment
that supported their position.29 The lawyers for the Justice Department
also kept their research efforts among their own staff. Their brief cut
a middle path between the arguments of the NAACP and the states and
concluded that the material was ultimately “inconclusive”—although
on balance the Justice Department brief leaned in the direction of the
NAACP’s position.30 Finally, Justice Frankfurter had his clerk Alexander Bickel spend a summer concluding an examination of the

27 NAACP Brief, supra note 2. I discuss the NAACP’s research and the resulting brief
below, see infra notes 43–79; see also KLUGER, supra note 19, at 617–46; Alfred H. Kelly, An
Inside View of “Brown v. Board,” Address Delivered Before the American Historical Association (Dec.
28, 1961): Hearing on the Nomination of Thurgood Marshall Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 166 (1962) [hereinafter Kelly, An Inside View]; Alfred H. Kelly, When
the Supreme Court Ordered Desegregation, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 5, 1962, at 86; JOHN
HOPE FRANKLIN, The Historian and the Public Policy (1974), reprinted in RACE AND HISTORY:
SELECTED ESSAYS, 1938–1988, at 309 (1989); C. VANN WOODWARD, THINKING BACK: THE
PERILS OF WRITING HISTORY 88–89 (1986); JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS:
HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 180–89
(1994).
28 KLUGER, supra note 19, at 646–50; WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, LAWYER’S LAWYER: THE
LIFE OF JOHN W. DAVIS 508–09 (1973); PAUL E. WILSON, A TIME TO LOSE: REPRESENTING
KANSAS IN BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 156–80 (1995).
29 Brief for the State of Kansas on Reargument, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (No. 1) [hereinafter Kansas Brief on Reargument], reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
759 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS].
On the drafting of this brief, see HARBAUGH, supra note 28, at 483–519; KLUGER, supra note
19, at 646–50; WILSON, supra note 28, at 177; Interview by Richard Kluger with J. Lindsay
Almond, J., U.S. Ct. of Customs & Pat. Appeals, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 5, 1972) (on file
with the Notre Dame Law Review from Brown vs. Board of Education Collection, supra note 20,
Series 1, Box 1, Folder 2). This research was later collected in SEGREGATION AND THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT IN THE STATES (Bernard D. Reams, Jr., & Paul E. Wilson eds.,
1975).
30 See Supplemental Brief for the United States on Reargument, Brown, 347 U.S. at
483 (Nos. 1, 2, 4, 8, 10), reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 29, at 853, 972;
Appendix to the Supplemental Brief for the United States on Reargument, Brown, 347 U.S.
at 483 (Nos. 1, 2, 4, 8, 10), reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3 (Philip B. Kurland &
Gerhard Casper eds., 1975); see also HERBERT BROWNELL & JOHN P. BURKE, ADVISING IKE:
THE MEMOIRS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL HERBERT BROWNELL 186–201 (1993); KLUGER, supra
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historical record of the Fourteenth Amendment that Bickel had begun
the previous summer. Justice Frankfurter would distribute the final
product of this research, which like the Justice Department brief
stressed the ambiguity of the record of the framing of the amendment,
to his fellow Justices prior to the reargument hearings.31 The sheer
mass of material presented to the Court was impressive. Paul E.
Wilson, attorney for Kansas, observed that all the submitted briefs on
reargument together took up eight inches of shelf space.32
SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ORIGINALISM
AT THE TIME OF BROWN
When the Supreme Court issued its 1953 reargument order, most
people who had considered the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment on the question of school segregation had come to the
same conclusion: the Framers of the Amendment did not intend, and
it was not generally understood at the time, to prohibit racial
segregation in schools. Not all scholars agreed that the issue was so cut
and dry,33 and the NAACP would highlight the work of the small cadre
of scholars who were challenging the dominant account. But the
mainstream wisdom on the issue among legal scholars and historians
was that the evidence against reading the history of the framing and
ratification as justifying school desegregation was overwhelming.
This standard account relied on three primary sources of
evidence: the legislative history of the drafting of the Fourteenth
Amendment; state practices and public opinion at the time of the

note 19, at 650–52; John J. Cound, A Very New Lawyer’s First Case: Brown v. Board of
Education, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 57 (1998); Elman, supra note 19, at 834–36.
31 Drafts of Bickel’s research are found in FFP-HLS and Alexander M. Bickel Papers,
Box 22, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut. Bickel’s work,
in revised form, was published as Bickel, supra note 7. See also KLUGER, supra note 19, at
652–55; Bickel Interview, supra note 20; Letter from Alexander M. Bickel, Clerk, Chambers
of J. Felix Frankfurter, to Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. J., U.S. Sup. Ct. (Aug. 22, 1953) (on file
with FFP-HLS, supra note 20, at Part III, Alexander Mordecai Bickel Correspondence with
Felix Frankfurter, Box 205, Folder 4, Page 5) (ProQuest) [hereinafter Letter from Bickel
to Frankfurter].
32 WILSON, supra note 28, at 179. In oral argument, John W. Davis estimated that the
reargument order resulted in “somewhere between 1500 and 2000 pages to the possible
entertainment, if not the illumination, of the Court.” ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952–1955, at
206 (Leon Friedman ed., 1969) [hereinafter ARGUMENT].
33 See, e.g., JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1951); Howard Jay Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth
Amendment: I Genesis, 1833–1835, 1950 WIS. L. REV. 479; John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro,
The Original Understanding of “Equal Protection of the Laws,” 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 133
(1950).
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drafting and ratification; and federal policy on school segregation
during this period.
Legislative History. The argument that the Framers did not intend
for the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit racial segregation in
schools drew on the words of members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress
in debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth
Amendment. Proponents of this position first pointed to the fact that
the issue of racial segregation, whether in schools or elsewhere, was
almost never discussed in these debates. The implication was that if
the Framers had meant to strike down segregation in schools, they
would have said so. They also pointed to critics of the Civil Rights Act
who argued in Congress that the law was too sweeping and that it would
have a litany of undesirable consequences, such as banning
prohibitions on interracial marriage and granting the vote to black
men; requiring integration of public schools was occasionally included
in this list.34 In response to these attacks, Congressman James Wilson
of Iowa, the Chairman of the Committee on Judiciary who introduced
the Civil Rights Bill in the House, insisted that the right to vote, to be
on a jury, and to “attend the same schools . . . are not civil rights or
immunities.”35 In Bickel’s assessment, the “obvious conclusion,” to
which the legislative history “easily leads,” is that the Amendment “as
originally understood, was meant to apply neither to jury service, nor
suffrage, nor antimiscegenation statutes, nor segregation.”36
Defenders of the standard account viewed this relatively scant
legislative record through a Dunning School inflected skepticism,
which predisposed them to be dismissive of the quality of constitutional engagement of the Radical Republicans. They criticized the
Framers for failing to adequately engage with the ramifications of their
work, offering instead a record of political opportunism, a desire to

34 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 500 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Edgar
Cowan) (describing the possibility of requiring integrated schools as “monstrous”); id. at
541 (remarks of Rep. John L. Dawson) (similar); id. at 1268 (remarks of Rep. Michael Kerr)
(similar); id. at 1121 (remarks of Rep. Andrew Rogers) (similar).
35 Id. at 1117 (remarks of Rep. James Wilson). Michael McConnell notes of Wilson’s
response: “This was the only statement by a proponent of the bill during the debates
specifically denying its applicability to school desegregation.” Michael W. McConnell,
Originalism and the Desegregation Decision, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 960 (1995).
36 Bickel, supra note 7, at 58; see also id. at 59 (“If the fourteenth amendment were a
statute, a court might very well hold, on the basis of what has been said so far, that it was
foreclosed from applying it to segregation in public schools. The evidence of congressional
purpose is as clear as such evidence is likely to be, and no language barrier stands in the
way of construing the section in conformity with it.”); Kansas Brief on Reargument, supra
note 29, at 15 (“All available evidence points to the conclusion that a majority of the
Congress which submitted the Fourteenth Amendment, did not contemplate or understand
that it would abolish segregation in the public schools.”).

2022]

BROWN, HISTORY, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

1487

punish the South, and a good deal of abstract rhetoric.37 John W.
Davis, the famed attorney who defended South Carolina’s school
segregation policy before the Court, complained to the Justices at oral
argument that “perhaps[] there has never been a Congress in which
the debates furnished less real pablum on which history might feed. It
was what Claude Bowers calls in his book The Tragic Era, well-named—
flames of partisan passion were still burning over the ashes of the Civil
War.”38
State Practices. The historical claim that the American people
generally did not see the Fourteenth Amendment as in conflict with
segregated schools centered on the fact that many states had segregated schools at the time they voted to ratify the Amendment, and that
even more states created segregated schools in the years immediately
following ratification.39 A related piece of evidence for the standard
account is a claim that public opinion, as best it could be determined,
generally opposed integrated education at the time of the framing and
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.40
Federal Policy. The final pillar of the standard account centered
on the actions Congress took (or failed to take) on school segregation.
Congress allowed segregation in the public schools in the District of
Columbia.41 And during deliberations over a bill that would eventually
37 See, e.g., Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV.
119, 134 (describing a “general aura of vagueness that surrounded the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment in the two Houses” and noting that “[t]he debate was conducted
almost entirely in terms of grand symbolism—that of the Declaration of Independence in
particular—and remarkably little in terms of the specific legal implications of the new
amendment”).
38 ARGUMENT, supra note 32, at 208. Davis went on to say that Radical Republican
Thaddeus Stevens was “called by historians perhaps the most unlovely character in
American history, more concerned to humiliate the aristocrats of the South, as he called
them, even than to preserve the rights of the Negro.” Id.; see also Bickel, supra note 7, at 62
(“It is, of course, giving the men of the 39th Congress much more than their due to ennoble
them by a comparison of their proceedings with the deliberations of the Philadelphia
Convention.”).
39 See, e.g., Kansas Brief on Reargument, supra note 29, at 15; ARGUMENT, supra note
32, at 215; McConnell, supra note 35, at 965–70.
40 See, e.g., Alfred H. Kelly, The Congressional Controversy over School Segregation, 1867–
1875, 64 AM. HIST. REV. 537, 539 (1959) (noting “comparatively little popular interest in
national mixed school legislation”); McConnell, supra note 35, at 956 (noting that school
segregation “almost certainly enjoyed the support of a majority of the population even at
the height of Reconstruction”).
41 See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 40, at 545–46; McConnell, supra note 35, at 977–80. Chief
Justice Fred Vinson cited this evidence in the Justices’ conference following the first round
of oral arguments in Brown, in December 1952. As Justice Jackson recorded his comments,
Vinson said: “Congress pass[ed] no statute [to the] contrary. [The same m]en [were] there
who passed [the] amendments. Hard get[ting] away [from] that interpretation of
Amendments.” Michael J. Klarman, Response, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional
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be passed as the Civil Rights Act of 1875, members of Congress
removed a provision that would have prohibited school segregation.42
According to this argument, if the members of Congress saw the
Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting segregation in schools, they
would have used their power to actually end this practice when they
had the opportunity to do so.
THE NAACP’S COUNTER-HISTORY
The lawyers for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund
ultimately produced a counter-history. Their brief argued that the
Reconstruction Amendments should be seen as the culminating
achievement of abolitionism, that they were understood at the time as
having transformed the balance of power between the federal
government and the states, and that their Framers intended them to
prohibit “all forms of state-imposed racial distinctions”43—including
racial segregation in schools.
When they began their research following the Court’s reargument
order, however, the NAACP lawyers ran into a wall of skepticism. The
historian Henry Steele Commager questioned the basis of the entire
research project. “The framers of the amendment did not, so far as we
know, intend that it should be used to end segregation in schools,” he
wrote in response to an NAACP request for assistance. “I strongly urge
that you consider dropping this particular argument as I think it tends
to weaken your case.”44 Carl Swisher, a political scientist from Johns
Hopkins University, offered a similarly pessimistic response to the
NAACP legal team.45 Louis Pollak, a lawyer with the State Department
who for several years had been advising the NAACP, also thought the
historical angle impossible to win. “If we win,” he confided to an
NAACP lawyer, “it’ll be on the basis that the clause requires an
increasingly high standard of achievement as times and mores
Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1908–09 n.67 (1995)
(alterations in original) (quoting Justice Robert Jackson, Conference Notes, Segregation
Cases (Dec. 12, 1952) (on file with Library of Congress, Robert H. Jackson Papers, 1816–
1983 [hereinafter Robert H. Jackson Papers], Box 184)). Justice Felix Frankfurter pressed
Assistant Attorney General J. Lee Rankin on this point in oral argument. ARGUMENT, supra
note 32, at 242.
42 See 3 CONG. REC., 43rd Cong., 2d Sess., 1010–11 (1875); Alfred Avins, De Facto and
De Jure School Segregation: Some Reflected Light on the Fourteenth Amendment from the Civil Rights
Act of 1875, 38 MISS. L.J. 179 (1967).
43 NAACP Brief, supra note 2, at 17; see also ARGUMENT, supra note 32, at 182–85.
44 KLUGER, supra note 19, at 620. For more on Commager’s racial positions in this
period, which were generally supportive of the NAACP efforts, yet never outspokenly so,
see NEIL JUMONVILLE, HENRY STEELE COMMAGER: MIDCENTURY LIBERALISM AND THE
HISTORY OF THE PRESENT 145–53 (1999).
45 KLUGER, supra note 19, at 620–21.
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change.”46 An originalist interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Pollak concluded, could only hurt their cause.47
The NAACP eventually secured several prominent scholars to
undertake research for their cause. Horace Mann Bond, president of
Lincoln University and the leading scholar of African American
education of his day, drafted a study on the impact of the Fourteenth
Amendment on public schools in the South.48 Alfred H. Kelly, professor of constitutional history at Wayne State University, contributed a
study of the original intention of the Framers of the Amendment, 49
while Howard Jay Graham, a librarian at the Los Angeles County Law
Library, contributed research on the antislavery background of key
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.50 C. Vann Woodward, at the
time a history professor at Johns Hopkins and author of several wellreceived studies of the post–Civil War South, wrote a paper on the
decline of Reconstruction in which he emphasized the nation’s
abandonment of the original purposes of the Reconstruction
Amendments.51 John Hope Franklin also wrote of the decline of
Reconstruction, focusing on the growth of segregation and the
rejection of the egalitarian impulse embodied in the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.52 William T. Coleman, a lawyer
working in Philadelphia, used contacts he had cultivated as a student
46 Letter from Louis H. Pollak, Special Assistant, Dep’t of State, to Robert L. Carter,
Legal Assistant, NAACP Legal Def. Fund (Aug. 1, 1953) (on file with the Notre Dame Law
Review from Library of Congress, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund Records,
1915–1968 [hereinafter NAACP Papers], Part II, Series B, Container 140).
47 Id.
48 Alfred H. Kelly, The School Desegregation Case, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE
CONSTITUTION 307, 325 (John A. Garraty ed., rev. ed. 1987).
49 Kelly’s revised efforts were published as Alfred H. Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment
Reconsidered: The Segregation Question, 54 MICH. L. REV. 1049 (1956).
50 Graham’s contribution to the NAACP was a summary of a study he had previously
published as Howard Jay Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth
Amendment: I Genesis, 1833–1835, supra note 33, and Howard Jay Graham, The Early
Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment: II Systemization, 1835–1837, 1950 WIS. L.
REV. 610.
51 Woodward’s contribution, entitled, “The Background of the Abandonment of
Reconstruction,” is available in several locations, including as page scans at Loren Miller
Papers, 1876–2003, HUNTINGTON, https://hdl.huntington.org/digital/collection/p15150
coll7/id/38962/rec/6 (last visited Apr. 25, 2022); NAACP Papers, supra note 46, at Part II,
Series, B, Container 140.
52 The essay Franklin prepared for the NAACP is not in the NAACP papers at the
Library of Congress, but a revised version of the essay was published as John Hope Franklin,
Jim Crow Goes to School: The Genesis of Legal Segregation in Southern Schools, 58 S. ATL. Q. 225
(1959). Franklin refers to this article as based on his NAACP paper in a letter to Richard
Kluger. Letter from John Hope Franklin, Professor, Univ. of Chi., to Richard Kluger (Jan.
25, 1972) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review from Brown v. Board of Education
Collection, supra note 20, at Box 2).
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at Harvard Law School, as a clerk for Justice Frankfurter (he was the
first African American to clerk for a Supreme Court Justice), and as a
practicing lawyer to commission studies of the circumstances
surrounding the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in the
various states.53
The challenge of locating the right balance between objective
historical scholarship and legal advocacy was ever-present. When
Woodward expressed concern to an NAACP lawyer about maintaining
his role as a historian, the attorney assured him,
Your conclusions are your own[.] . . . If they do not help our side
of the case, in all probability the lawyers will not use them. If they
do help our argument, the present plan is to include them in the
overall summary argument and to file the whole work as a brief in
an appendix. No matter what happens, your work will be of real
educational value to the men who must argue before the
Court. . . .54

This sort of hands-off approach worked well during the summer
months when the historians were working on their individual
monographs. By the fall, when it came time to write their brief,
however, the lawyers and historians confronted hard questions about
how to address the historical questions posed by the Court.
These questions about objective scholarship versus advocacy never
resulted in anything approaching direct confrontation between the
lawyers and historians. All the historians who signed on were sympathetic to the cause of desegregation, and the common goal of the
historians and lawyers created an atmosphere that was, by all accounts,
collegial. Yet, there were important differences in how the two groups
approached the task at hand. The division between the work done by
the NAACP lawyers and that done by the scholars they hired was clearly
defined from the beginning. The internal memorandums of the
NAACP described the scholars as engaged in “non-legal research.”55
Even though the historians were employed by the lawyers and thus in
a sense responsible to them, the nature of their work and the NAACP’s
view of that work allowed for each group to maintain its distinct
professional identity, even as they worked toward a common goal. But
there were also particular expectations on the lawyers’ part in terms of
what the historians were supposed to offer. In a revealing letter from
John A. Davis, who was in charge of organizing the historical research,
53 Two folders of research material Coleman gathered are in the Library of Congress,
NAACP Papers, supra note 46, at Part II, Series B, Container 141.
54 KLUGER, supra note 19, at 624 (last alteration in original).
55 Letter from John A. Davis, Counsel, NAACP Legal Def. Fund, to Thurgood
Marshall, Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Def. Fund (Sept. 9, 1953) (on file with the Notre
Dame Law Review from NAACP Papers, supra note 46, at Part II, Series B, Container 140.
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to Thurgood Marshall updating the chief NAACP lawyer on the
progress of the “non-legal research,” Davis summarized the work of
the historians. “It is hoped,” Davis wrote, “that the net effect of this
research will be to show that it was the intent of those persons who
proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to outlaw state or federal
distinctions because of race where governmental action, service, or
protection was involved.” In the following sentence, Davis wrote, “It is
also proposed to show that the states and the Congress at the time of
the Amendment felt that segregation in education was improper . . . .”
Davis prefaced further points that the scholars will make with the
following: “The research will show . . .”; “The research will then
outline . . .”; “The research will dwell on . . .”; “It will indicate . . .”;
“Lastly, the research will show . . .”56 The tentative nature of the first
sentences (“It is hoped”) had shifted into declarative statements about
what the research would produce. Even without any overt pressure,
the NAACP had clear expectations of the work of the historians.
The lawyers and the historians first got a chance to work together
directly in September 1953 when the NAACP organized a conference
to discuss the work these scholars produced during the previous
summer. Along with the contributors, there were about forty legal
scholars and historians in attendance to assist the NAACP legal team.57
The conference was organized as a series of seminars in which an effort
was made to integrate the historical material into an effective legal
argument. It was at this point that the stirrings of tensions between the
approaches of the two groups began to appear. Evidence that seemed
to contradict or challenge the NAACP’s case was eagerly examined by
the lawyers because they wanted to be ready to rebut the opposing legal
team’s arguments.58 But in deciding how to use the historical material
for their own argument, the lawyers, in Alfred Kelly’s words, “appeared
to . . . plunge[] into a state of vast uncertainty.”59 While the historical
material was not necessarily damaging to the NAACP’s case—
according to Kelly, it “was both good and bad”—Davis’s expectations
of what the historians would bring back had not been fully realized.60
The historical research was complicated and open to a variety of
interpretations, as the historians emphasized during the conference.
This was not what the lawyers wanted to hear. As NAACP lawyer Robert

56 Id.
57 The number is Kelly’s estimate. Of the individuals who contributed research, only
Graham did not attend the September conference. Others attending included Robert K.
Carr, Robert Cushman, Jr., Milton Konvitz, Walter Gellhorn, and John Frank. Kelly, supra
note 48, at 325–26.
58 Kelly, An Inside View, supra note 27, at 172.
59 Id.
60 Kelly, supra note 48, at 326.
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Carter would later explain, “We wanted the historians to look at the
whole thing from the viewpoint of the blacks and their aspirations, not
from some cloud . . . . All history is a distortion of sorts, depending on
the historian’s myopia and precepts.”61 This type of attitude toward
the historian’s craft, while perhaps epistemologically sound, had the
potential to cause some tension, or at least a measure of self-reflection,
among the historians working for the NAACP.
The historian who was most affected by the experience of working
for the NAACP in Brown was Alfred Kelly. Of all the historians he,
along with John Hope Franklin, worked most closely with the NAACP
lawyers. Following the September conference, Kelly returned to the
NAACP New York legal office in the middle of October and again in
early November to advise the lawyers drafting the brief that would
eventually be submitted to the Supreme Court in time for oral
arguments in December.62
When Kelly reflected back on his contribution to Brown, which he
did often in the following years, he invariably focused on the conflict
he felt as an historian working in the legal arena. In 1961 he gave a
paper at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association,
titled An Inside View of Brown v. Board. In addition to detailing his
work with the NAACP, this paper offered an extended meditation on
the distinction between historical objectivity and legal advocacy. That
there was a clear distinction, Kelly was sure. That his work with the
NAACP in effect blurred this distinction, he was also sure. “I was facing
for the first time in my own career,” Kelly recalled, “the deadly
opposition between my professional integrity as a historian and my
wishes and hopes with respect to a contemporary question of values, of
ideals, of policy, of partisanship, and of political objectives. . . . [I]t
bothered me terribly.”63 Kelly’s solution to this dilemma was to
embrace the role of legal advocate, abandoning his identity as a
historian. As Kelly explained it:
The problem we faced was not the historian’s discovery of the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; the problem instead
was the formulation of an adequate gloss on the fateful events of
1866 sufficient to convince the Court that we had something of a
historical case. Never has there been, for me at least, a more
dramatic illustration of the difference in function, technique, and
outlook between lawyer and historian. It is not that we were
engaged in formulating lies; there was nothing as crude and naive
61 KLUGER, supra note 19, at 623–24.
62 Kelly, supra note 48, at 327–29.
63 Kelly, An Inside View, supra note 27, at 171; see Nomination of Thurgood Marshall:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 163 (1967). Kelly noted that
historian Howard K. Beale told him at the conference that he felt similarly. Kelly, An Inside
View, supra note 27, at 171–72.
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as that. But we were using facts, emphasizing facts, bearing down
on facts, sliding off facts, quietly ignoring facts, and above all
interpreting facts in a way to do what Marshall said we had to do—
“get by those boys down there.”64

Kelly’s words were later used by segregationist Senators to
question Marshall’s legal ethics during his 1962 confirmation hearing
for an appointment as a federal judge. After Marshall defended
himself, the Judiciary Committee called Kelly to the hearing, where he
was given an opportunity to explain his role in Brown and his
impressions of the nominee. In his defense of Marshall, Kelly further
elaborated on what he saw as the critical distinction between history
and advocacy: “[T]o imply that because Marshall and his professional
associates did not write professional history when they prepared their
brief in Brown v. Board, that they were thereby guilty of professional
malfeasance, is grossly to misconstrue the modus operandi of the legal
profession.”65
Two years later, Kelly was again writing about his experience
working on Brown. Again, he made the point of distinguishing
between history and legal advocacy, making clear that the NAACP
brief, and his own contribution to that brief, was legal advocacy, not
history.66 Then in 1965 Kelly devoted an article to the potential pitfalls
of what he called the “[i]llicit [l]ove [a]ffair” of history and the
Supreme Court. He defended the “law-office history” in the NAACP
brief because it “manipulated history in the best tradition of American
advocacy.”67 In all these reflections of his experience in Brown, Kelly
never abandoned his belief in the need to draw a sharp distinction
between history and activism. The historian could successfully cross
this divide, as Kelly admitted he had, but he insisted that this crossing
amounted to a shift in the historian's professional identity.
John Hope Franklin never expressed the kind of angst Kelly did
over the challenges of engaging in legal advocacy. When Franklin
discussed the issue, he chose a different starting point. As a pioneering
black historian in an overwhelmingly white profession, his primary
concern was negotiating the terrain of Jim Crow America as an African
American citizen and an historian.68 On the one hand, Franklin felt a
64 Kelly, An Inside View, supra note 27, at 174.
65 Nomination of Thurgood Marshall: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong. 185 (1967).
66 Kelly, supra note 48.
67 Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 119,
144.
68 Franklin published the first edition of his landmark FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEGROES in 1947. In 1956, after a decade on the faculty of Howard
University, Franklin was appointment chair of the history department at Brooklyn College,
the first African American appointed chair in any department at a traditionally white
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particular burden to faithfully practice the commonly accepted methods of his profession. The racism the black historian encountered in
American society, Franklin noted, might lead to “the temptation to
pollute his scholarship with polemics, diatribes, arguments,” but doing
this would only undermine the historian’s scholarly credibility.69 The
black scholar must “mak[e] certain that his conclusions are sanctioned
by universal standards developed and maintained by those who
frequently do not even recognize him.”70
Yet the black historian also has a responsibility to the cause of
social progress. “[T]he major choice for the Negro scholar,” Franklin
wrote,
is whether he should turn his back on the world, concede that he is
the Invisible Man, and lick the wounds that come from cruel
isolation, or whether he should use his training, talents, and
resources to beat down the barriers that keep him out of the
mainstream of American life and scholarship.71

For Franklin, the danger was failing to appreciate the power of the
trained mind to improve society. The theme of education and responsibility featured in the research he prepared for the NAACP, where he
described segregated schools as “an important means of social control
and a device for perpetuating the ignorance of a great mass of
blacks.”72 Franklin insisted that to counter the dangers of oppression
through educational neglect, scholars, particularly those who had
overcome the obstacles of an unjust system, as he had, must recognize
their special duty to society.
Franklin, like Kelly, acknowledged the distinction between
scholarship and advocacy, but, unlike Kelly, he saw this distinction as
fluid, negotiable. Historical scholarship and advocacy could be fruitfully combined through “the use of objective data in the passionate
advocacy of the rectification of injustice.”73 Franklin felt flattered
when Marshall told him the paper he prepared for the NAACP
sounded like a lawyer’s brief. “I had deliberately transformed the
objective data provided by historical research into an urgent plea for
justice,” he recalled.74 “I hoped that my scholarship did not suffer.”75
institution. In 1964 he joined the history department at the University of Chicago. John
Hope Franklin, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-Hope-Franklin
[https://perma.cc/4DSE-PSZ8].
69 JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, The Dilemma of the American Negro Scholar (1963), reprinted in
RACE AND HISTORY, supra note 27, at 304–05.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 307.
72 Franklin, supra note 52, at 234.
73 FRANKLIN, supra note 69, at 306.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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The work with the lawyers, Franklin noted at another point, “was not
easy, for I was too much committed to truth to try to distort history.”76
He never abandoned the idea of historical objectivity, nor did he
consider his dedication to this ideal in conflict with his involvement in
the developing civil rights movement.77 When he reminisced about his
contribution in Brown, he described how well the historians and
lawyers worked together—it was, he remembered, “one of the greatest
experiences of my life.”78 The challenge in Franklin’s mind was simply
a matter of placing the historical material into a legal setting.79 The
dilemma that so preoccupied Kelly was much less of a concern for
Franklin, who viewed the issue, first and foremost, as one of social
responsibility.
THE BROWN COURT’S TURN FROM HISTORY
For all the hours and angst that went into the NAACP’s efforts to
find in history a line of argument challenging segregation, their brief
had little impact on the Court. Although the NAACP’s briefs contained historical insights that would gain credence within the historical
profession in the coming years, the Justices did not think much of the
NAACP’s conclusions. Indeed, several of them had already made up
their minds that there was no way in which the original meaning of the
amendment required desegregation. In the Justices’ conference
following the first round of oral arguments in late 1952, Justice
Frankfurter declared that he had “read all of [the Fourteenth
Amendment’s] history” and he “can’t say that it meant to abolish
segregation.”80 Jackson agreed, noting that he could find “nothing in
the text [of the Constitution] that says this is unconstitutional. Nothing
in the opinions of the courts say it is unconstitutional. Nothing in the

76 Letter from John Hope Franklin, Professor, Univ. of Chi., to Richard Kluger (Nov.
28, 1973) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review from Brown vs. Board of Education
Collection, supra note 20, at Series 1, Box 2, Folder 33) [hereinafter Letter from Franklin
to Kluger].
77 Peter Novick emphasizes Franklin’s dedication to “the universalist and objectivist
norms of the profession,” in THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 472 (1988). Franklin wrote to Richard Kluger, “I had
never distorted history, and I would not do so in the Brown case. The pieces I wrote
reflected my attitude toward the canons of history.” Letter from Franklin to Kluger, supra
note 76.
78 Letter from John Hope Franklin, Professor, Univ. of Chi., to Richard Kluger (Oct.
23, 1973) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review from Brown vs. Board of Education
Collection, supra note 20, at Series 1, Box 2, Folder 33).
79 FRANKLIN, supra note 27, at 312.
80 IN CONFERENCE, supra note 22, at 651; see also ARGUMENT, supra note 32, at 188
(asking of this historical research, “now that we have got it, what are we to get out of it?”).
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history of the Fourteenth amendment . . . .”81 In the spring of 1954,
when Jackson was drafting a concurrence in the case, he remained
skeptical. In his unissued opinion, he wrote, “It is hard to find an
indication that any influential body of the movement that carried the
Civil War Amendments had reached the point of thinking about either
segregation or education of the Negro as a current problem, and
harder still to find that the Amendments were designed to be a
solution.”82 By the time of the decision, Justice Frankfurter was asking
whether “it is . . . too much to hope that no further appeal will be made
to the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment to support
arguments, one way or the other, as to the intended scope of the
Amendment.”83 Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, at least, had had
more than their fill of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment.84
Chief Justice Warren chose not to adopt an interpretation that
went against the conventional wisdom on the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment that the Justices basically accepted. Rather,
he opted to de-emphasize the importance of the historical material. In
doing so he had two guides: the Justice Department’s brief, and
Bickel’s research. Of the four research projects spawned by the reargument order, these two fit comfortably between the findings of the
NAACP and the states. Both found the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment “inconclusive” with regard to school segregation.
In the end, the work of the legal teams for the contesting parties took

81 IN CONFERENCE, supra note 22, at 652.
82 Unpublished Opinion of Robert H. Jackson in Brown v. Board, supra note 15, at 125.
83 Memorandum for the Conference from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. J., U.S. Sup. Ct.
(May 18, 1954) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review from University of Kentucky
Libraries, Stanley Forman Reed Papers, Box 324).
84 Before the school segregation cases arrived at the Court, Justices Frankfurter and
Jackson had been expressing their frustration with originalist inquiries into the history of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Letter from Robert H. Jackson, Assoc. J, U.S. Sup. Ct., to
Charles Fairman, Professor, Stanford Univ. (Oct. 18, 1949) (on file with the Notre Dame Law
Review from Robert H. Jackson Papers, supra note 41, at Container 12) (“I think you have
done a great service to the legal profession, not only in bringing to light the real facts about
the Fourteenth Amendment but in demonstrating the danger of going into history to
reconstruct past attitudes as a basis for changing the constitutional doctrine. I am one who
believes that we have gone too far in going into legislative history to clear up ambiguities
which we sometime go to legislative history to create. It is even more treacherous ground
in constitutional matters, as you have so well demonstrated. While I would not want to say
that we should never take into account legislative history or the history of the times, it is
certainly a path to tread with care.”); Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. J., U.S. Sup. Ct.,
to Charles Fairman, Professor, Stanford Univ. (Jan. 27, 1950) (on file with the Notre Dame
Law Review from FFP-HLS, supra note 20, at Part III, Box 184, folder 16) (“[T]his business
of trying to find the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment in this or that pamphlet or this
or that individual expression of hope of what was accomplished by the Amendment is . . .
no way of dealing with a ‘constituent act’ like the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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a back seat to the other research projects, which Chief Justice Warren
considered more reliable.
The Justice Department brief particularly impressed the Chief
Justice. Assistant Attorney General J. Lee Rankin told the Court at oral
argument that the Justice Department lawyers believed it their “duty”
to approach the relevant history “much as historians would.”85 They
sought “to draw from it the facts just as objectively as any party could
on either side” and to “present what the history showed, whether it
hurt or helped either side.”86 Chief Justice’s faith in the government’s
work was revealed in his first draft of Brown, where he singled out the
Justice Department brief as “particularly objective and helpful” and
specifically noted that the Court’s “inconclusive” finding came from
that brief.87 In subsequent revisions explicit reliance on the Justice
Department was whittled away. One of the Chief Justice’s clerks, Earl
Pollock, revised Chief Justice Warren’s draft to include the line: “We
conclude, as did the Government, that the legislative history of the
Amendment is inconclusive . . . .”88 The eventual wording of this
section was a mixture of Pollock’s revision and that of his fellow clerk,
Richard Flynn. Flynn’s version, referring to the Justice Department,
read: “Their efforts and our own convince us that these sources cast
little light on the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are
inconclusive.”89 By the final draft of the opinion, specific reference to
the Justice Department brief was gone, and the inconclusiveness of the

85 ARGUMENT, supra note 32, at 240.
86 Id.
87 Draft Memorandum from Earl Warren, C.J., U.S. Sup. Ct. 2–3 (c. 1954) (on file
with the Notre Dame Law Review from Library of Congress, Earl Warren Papers [hereinafter
Earl Warren Papers], Container 571) (typed draft without footnotes). Note: The version
quoted is the typed version of the handwritten first draft; the phrase “objective and” was
added by hand in Chief Justice Warren’s writing and is not included in the handwritten
version of the first draft. Compare id., with Draft Memorandum from Earl Warren, C.J., U.S.
Sup. Ct. 3 (c. 1954) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review from Earl Warren Papers, supra,
at Container 571) [hereinafter Handwritten Draft] (handwritten draft). Earlier in the first
draft Warren also noted that the Justice Department “ably” responded to the reargument
order. Handwritten Draft, supra, at 3. Chief Justice Warren had praised the Justice
Department brief in the Justices’ conference and in conversation with Attorney General
Herbert Brownell. IN CONFERENCE, supra note 22, at 654; ROBERT FREDRICK BURK, THE
EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS 140 (1984).
88 Revision of Draft Memorandum from Earl Warren, C.J., U.S. Sup. Ct., by Earl
Pollock, Clerk, Chambers of C.J. Earl Warren 3 (May 4, 1954) (on file with the Notre Dame
Law Review from Earl Warren Papers, supra note 87, at Container 571).
89 Revision of Draft Memorandum from Earl Warren, C.J., U.S. Sup. Ct, by Richard J.
Flynn, Clerk, Chambers of C.J. Earl Warren (May 3, 1954) (on file with the Notre Dame Law
Review from Earl Warren Papers, supra note 87, at Container 571).
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history was attributed to the “discussion” that resulted from
reargument and “our own investigation.”90
Bickel’s research also influenced the Justices’ deliberation.
Justice Frankfurter distributed drafts of his clerk’s work to the other
justices on at least two occasions, one directly prior to reargument and
again following the Brown ruling. With its first distribution Justice
Frankfurter attached a memorandum stating: “The memorandum
indicates that the legislative history of the Amendment is, in a word,
inconclusive, in the sense that the 39th Congress as an enacting body
neither manifested that the Amendment outlawed segregation in the
public schools or authorized legislation to that end, nor that it
manifested the opposite.”91 Pollock relied on the Bickel memorandum in writing to the Chief Justice, “The best that can be said is that
the evidence is ‘inconclusive.’”92 Bickel’s memorandum must have
been what the law clerk had in mind when he revised Chief Justice
Warren’s first draft to reference the Court’s own research (“We
conclude”) as an influencing factor—a reference that would remain in
the final opinion (“our own investigation”).93
The “inconclusive” conclusion, as presented to the Court in both
the Bickel memorandum and the Justice Department brief, served the
necessary purpose of getting around a key defense of the segregationist
position, while appearing to take a moderate, unbiased stance on the
historical debate. It justified the Justices’ move away from what they
saw as the constraints of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment.
OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM IN RECONSTRUCTION HISTORY
The research historians produced on behalf of the NAACP’s
desegregation campaign joined a steadily growing stream of accounts
90 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489. This basic wording first appeared in a
later draft, which was a composite of the clerk’s rewriting efforts. Draft Memoradum on
the State Cases from Earl Warren, C.J., U.S. Sup. Ct. 3 (c. 1954) (on file with the Notre Dame
Law Review from Earl Warren Papers, supra note 87, at Container 571) (typed draft with
footnotes).
91 Memorandum for the Conference by Felix Frankfurter, Assoc. J., U.S. Sup. Ct.
(Dec. 3, 1953) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review from Earl Warren Papers, supra note
87, at Container 571). Bickel had used the same word, “inconclusive,” to describe the
material in a letter to Justice Frankfurter attached to the first draft of his study. Letter from
Bickel to Frankfurter, supra note 31, at 3. In concluding his presentation of the material,
Bickel would argue that although the historical material was inconclusive, the Constitution
must be seen as a document flexible enough to deal with the changing times. This concept
of a “living Constitution,” which was also an approach favored by Frankfurter, would also
be integrated into Warren’s decision. See Letter from Bickel to Frankfurter, supra note 31.
92 Bench Memo for Nos. 1, 2, 4, 8, and 10, at 14 (c. 1954) (on file with the Notre Dame
Law Review from Earl Warren Papers, supra note 87, at Container 574).
93 Brown, 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
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of Reconstruction that sought to topple the still prevalent Dunning
School historiography.94 This revisionist scholarship emphasized the
egalitarian principles that animated the legal and constitutional
achievements of Reconstruction, and the dire consequences of white
America’s abandonment of these principles in the long Jim Crow era.95
“The civil rights revolution destroyed the pillars of the Dunning
School, especially its overt racism, and historians completely
overhauled the interpretation of Reconstruction,” writes Eric Foner.96
“If the era was tragic, we now think, it was not because it was attempted
but because in significant ways it failed, leaving to subsequent
generations the difficult problem of racial justice.”97 The historical
account of Reconstruction that the NAACP presented to the Court
captured the sentiment of future generations of historians far better
than any of the other historical projects launched by the Court’s
reargument order.
Yet even if the Dunning School has been displaced, many of the
premises of the Reconstruction history that stood in opposition to the
NAACP’s brief—those expressed in the briefs of the states, the Justice
Department, and Bickel’s conclusions—still resonate. Reconstruction
scholarship has tended to operate in two opposing registers: an
optimistic register that echoes the conclusions of the NAACP in Brown;
and a pessimistic register that echoes the conclusions of the other
briefs. Some scholars settle comfortably into one register; some slide
back and forth between the two. And as was the case in the historical
research Brown produced, demands of constitutional politics play a key
role in sorting people into one camp or the other.
Reconstruction optimism emphasizes the radicalism of the
period. This point if typically achieved by centering attention on the
abolitionists and Radical Republicans who were the most egalitarian
voices of the period and locating the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment (and other achievements of Reconstruction) in their
words and work. An early example from the legal academy was John
P. Frank and Robert F. Munro’s influential 1950 article on the original

94 See, e.g., LAWANDA COX & JOHN H. COX, POLITICS, PRINCIPLE, AND PREJUDICE,
1865–1866: DILEMMA OF RECONSTRUCTION AMERICA (1963); ERIC L. MCKITRICK, ANDREW
JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION (1960); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY (1964); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865–1877 (1965);
JOEL WILLIAMSON, AFTER SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN SOUTH CAROLINA DURING
RECONSTRUCTIONS, 1861–1877 (1965).
95 See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863–1877, at xix–xxvii (1988) (discussing the transformation of historiography of
Reconstruction in the 1960s, ’70s, and ’80s).
96 FONER, supra note 10, at xxiv.
97 Id.
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understanding of the Equal Protection Clause.98 Their analysis of the
origins of the phrase “equal protection of the laws” centered on the
work of Charles Sumner and attributed the addition of this principle
to the Fourteenth Amendment to a small group of Sumner’s Radical
Republican congressional allies.99 Having reduced the number of
“insiders” who were responsible for the Equal Protection Clause to fifteen members of Congress, they then located its original meaning by
determining what it meant to these men.100 They find that a majority
of these men understood the Equal Protection Clause as “preclud[ing]
any use whatsoever of color as a basis of legal distinctions,” with the
others either on record allowing that some limited forms of racial
classification could be permissible or not on record expressing a position on the reach of the equal protection principle.101 By paring away
moderate and conservative voices and centering attention on a small
number of the most uncompromising egalitarian white lawmakers,
Frank and Munro advanced an originalist reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment as an egalitarian instrument with revolutionary potential.
Another key move of Reconstruction optimists is to assume that
the period’s goals and constitutional achievements are best understood at relatively high levels of abstraction. Graham, the Los Angeles
librarian who worked with the NAACP legal team and who had
published seminal articles advancing an optimistic perspective on the
drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, chastised legal scholars and
historians for their “narrow antiquarianism” in which “[f]acts are
being determined and treated in isolation, one at a time, and virtually
out of their contexts.”102 The proper approach, Graham explained,
was to focus on the “thrilling story” of how the Fourteenth Amendment emerged as the culminating achievement of abolitionism,103 and
that the antislavery campaign was, at heart, a campaign against all

98 Frank & Munro, supra note 33. The article featured prominently in the NAACP
brief on reargument. NAACP Brief, supra note 2, at 93, 96–101.
99 Frank & Munro, supra note 33, at 136–38, 141.
100 Id. at 141–42.
101 Id. at 142.
102 Graham, supra note 21, at 7. On the problems with “narrow antiquarianism” in
approaching Fourteenth Amendment history, Graham wrote: “[E]ven if applied
evenhandedly this method is open to serious objection. It tends to make 1866 the decisive
date in American history; it gives rise to innumerable searches of records for guidance that
simply isn’t there; it leads to obscurantism and conjecture; almost inevitably it transforms
the humble ‘argument from silence’ into both a murderous and a suicidal weapon.” Id.
(quoting Howard Jay Graham, The “Conspiracy Theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE
L.J. 371, 386–87 (1938)).
103 Id. at 9.
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forms of racial discrimination.104 The NAACP took the same generalizing approach to Reconstruction history in its Brown brief.
The significance of level of generality in efforts to interpret the
history of the Fourteenth Amendment can be seen with particular
clarity in Bickel’s history of the Fourteenth Amendment.105 He
engaged the historical material on two distinct levels. First, he
analyzed the history at a narrow, particularistic level, concluding that
the Framers did not intend the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit
segregated schools. Then, at the end of the article, he shifted registers,
recognizing that the Framers’ work could also be understood at a more
general level, which left open the possibility that future lawmakers and
future judges could understand the amendment as prohibiting school
segregation.106 Only by shifting to this more abstract mode of analysis
did he arrive at a defense of the Brown decision on originalist
grounds.107
This very same abstracting move was the analytical centerpiece of
the first generation of modern originalists. For those who advocated
an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation in the 1970s
and 1980s, the assumption that originalism could not justify Brown was
a key obstacle. To respond to this critique, they typically asserted that
at a general level the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
supported Brown.108 In 1990, Robert Bork, who had offered a tentative

104 Id. at 10 n.34 (“It is impossible to overstress the fact that the antislavery movement
merely was the largest part of an anti-race discrimination movement. The discriminations
against free Negroes, and those against Indians for example, were as vigorously attacked as
slavery, and for the same reason: race and color were arbitrary, irrational bases for
distinctions in men’s rights.”); Graham, Our “Declaratory” Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L.
REV. 3, 9 (1954) (“Slavery is so odious a concept today that we are apt to forget that
essentially it was a system of race discrimination and a denial of the protection of law.”).
105 Bickel, supra note 7.
106 Bickel, supra note 7, at 59 (“Should not the search for congressional purpose . . .
properly be twofold? One inquiry should be directed at the congressional understanding
of the immediate effect of the enactment on conditions then present. Another should aim
to discover what if any thought was given to the long-range effect, under future
circumstances, of provisions necessarily intended for permanence.”).
107 Id. at 63–65.
108 See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 22, 27
(1985) (contending that Brown did not involve “adapting a ‘living,’ ‘flexible’ Constitution
to new reality” but rather “restoring the original principle of the Constitution to
constitutional law”); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1, 14 (1971) (defending Brown as aligned with the original intentions of the
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment based on two historical claims: that the drafters
“were not agreed about what the concept of racial equality requires”; and that they
“intended that the Supreme Court should secure against government action some large
measure of racial equality,” and this intention constitutes “the core meaning of the
amendment”).
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originalist defense of Brown in his seminal 1971 article,109 confidently
asserted, “Brown is consistent with, indeed is compelled by, the original
understanding of the fourteenth amendment’s equal protection
clause,”110 which he defined, with little elaboration or historical
support, as a commitment to “black equality.”111
But this leap of faith into the realm of generalities about the intention or meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment strained against the
foundational aspiration of early originalists: constraining interpretive
discretion. In an effort to address this perceived weakness of
originalism, Michael McConnell advanced a defense of Brown in his
1995 law review article Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions that
did not rely on abstracting egalitarian principles from Reconstruction
history.112 He summarized his findings in another article: “A close
examination of the [congressional] debates and votes on segregation
between 1870 and 1875 now convinces me that Brown v. Board of
Education was correctly decided on originalist grounds, not on the basis
of any high level of generality about equality, but on the basis of the
actual discussions and understandings of school segregation in the
period immediately following ratification of the Amendment.”113
Originalist scholars have embraced McConnell’s carefully researched
and argued originalist defense of Brown.114
McConnell’s argument turns on several interpretive choices. One
was to loosen the linkage between the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment. He emphasized that the Framers of the
amendment understood its reach to be broader than that of the civil
rights law, thus weakening the primary evidentiary basis for arguing

Early proponent of originalism Raoul Berger, by contrast, argued that Brown was
indefensible on originalist grounds. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 363–72 (1977).
109 Bork, supra note 108, at 13–15.
110 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 76 (1990).
111 Id. at 81.
112 McConnell, supra note 35.
113 Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education, 19
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 458 (1996).
114 See, e.g., ILAN WURMAN, A DEBT AGAINST THE LIVING: AN INTRODUCTION TO
ORIGINALISM 108–16 (2017); Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation
Decision, 99 VA. L. REV. 493, 495 (2013) (“[T]he ability of originalism to justify the Court’s
decision [in Brown] is now a widely shared assumption of originalist scholarship.” (citing
Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 663, 686 (2009))). McConnell’s article has also been the subject of extensive critiques.
See Klarman, supra note 41.
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that the congressional Framers saw no conflict between the Amendment and segregated schools.115 Another was to shift the focus of
analysis from 1866–1868, when the Thirty-Ninth Congress drafted and
the states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, to 1870–1875, the
period when Congress debated federal public accommodations
legislation—legislation that would ultimately be passed in the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 and that included for most of this period a provision
prohibiting racial discrimination in public schools.116 McConnell
notes that in the 1866–1868 period the historical record of debate in
Congress, on the campaign trails, and in the states includes few
mentions of school segregation; with regard to this material, he seems
to agree with Chief Justice Warren that the historical record is
inconclusive. The situation shifted dramatically in the early 1870s,
when school segregation became “the dominant political issue,” as
Congress considered federal legislation that would ban racial
discrimination in certain public spaces, including schools.117 (The
school provision would be removed from the bill prior to its passage in
1875.) These debates, he argues, offer the only real engagement with
the issue of racial segregation and education by those who framed and
defended the Fourteenth Amendment to the nation. Since the
congressional authority for the proposed legislation came from the
enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, McConnell
equates support for the legislation with a belief that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibited segregated schooling. And he finds majority
support in Congress for the legislation, even when it included the
school provision.118
In their recently published book, Randy Barnett and Evan Bernick
offer an originalist defense of Brown that revolves around many of the
same interpretive choices favored by other Reconstruction optimists.119
They elevate a group of abolitionists and Radical Republicans as
guiding lights in understanding the original meaning of the
115 “This course of events strongly suggests that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was not
understood to forbid school segregation, but it does not necessarily mean the same for the
Fourteenth Amendment.” McConnell, supra note 35, at 960 (footnote omitted). He then
argues: “A fair inference is that the Amendment was understood to encompass the broad
range of ‘civil rights and immunities’ that were entailed by the original draft of the 1866
Act.” Id. at 961. And: “Whether segregation of schools, transportation, or places of public
accommodation represented an inequality with respect to those rights was not debated or
resolved in 1866. As will be seen, the issue arose soon after ratification and was debated at
length. Those later debates, rather than the debates of 1866, hold the real answer to the
segregation question.” Id. at 962.
116 Id. at 984–90.
117 McConnell, supra note 113, at 459.
118 McConnell, supra note 35, at 1104–05.
119 BARNETT & BERNICK, supra note 10, at 30.

1504

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:4

Fourteenth Amendment.120 They expand the time period in which the
Amendment’s original meaning can be discerned, looking back to
pre–Civil War abolitionists thought121 and forward to debates over the
1875 Civil Rights Act.122 These choices advance their distinctive
originalist defense of Brown, which is that the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits school segregation not necessarily
because segregation violates the equal protection of the laws but
because schooling is among the privileges or immunities of national
citizenship.123
As this brief summary shows, legal historians with a range of
ideological commitments and in pursuit of various goals have
advanced variations of what I have labeled as optimistic frameworks for
understanding the Fourteenth Amendment. Reconstruction optimism can elevate the significance of the expanding cast of historical
actors who historians now recognize as having contributed to the
achievement of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is also a critical
assumption for those who, like the NAACP legal team in 1953, seek to
defend Brown on originalist grounds.
Reconstruction pessimism, by contrast, emphasizes the limitations
of Reconstruction, in terms both of its vision and achievements.
Proponents have spanned the ideological spectrum, from early twentieth century white supremacists to modern-day racial progressives.
They align on the foundational assumption of the resilience of white
supremacy through American history, and a belief that Reconstruction

120 Id. at 89, 97–99 (presenting the constitutional thought of abolitionists such as
Lysander Spooner and Joel Tiffany as reflecting a theory of “Republican [c]itizenship” on
which the Fourteenth Amendment was based); id. at 128 (praising John Bingham, the
principal drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment, as “an extraordinary figure on whom
scholars of the Fourteenth Amendment have rightly focused their attention”); id. at 140
(describing Representative Jacob Howard’s speech defending an expansive reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment as “more probative of the ratified amendment’s public meaning
than any other congressional speech concerning Section I”). Barnett has described his
scholarship on the Fourteenth Amendment as an effort to resurrect the insights of Howard
Jay Graham and Jacobus tenBroek, key contributors to the NAACP’s brief on the history of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist
Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 165, 169–70 (2011).
121 BARNETT & BERNICK, supra note 10, at 89–108 (chapter titled “The Antislavery
Origins of Republican Citizenship”).
122 Id. at 185–93.
123 Id. at 30 (“We think the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine was correctly held to be
unconstitutional because it is a construction that was unfaithful to the concept of
Republican citizenship comprising the original spirit of the clause.”); see also WURMAN,
supra note 10, at 4 (describing Brown as “astonishingly easy to defend . . . on the original
meaning of the privileges or immunities clause”).
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must be understood within this framework. Dunning School proponents accepted and often celebrated this fact;124 others have lamented
it. Historians who felt the Reconstruction optimism of the 1960s failed
to appreciate the persistence of racial and constitutional conservatism
have offered what has been termed “postrevisionist” account, characterizing Reconstruction as basically a moderate or even conservative
constitutional project.125 C. Vann Woodward, a contributor to the
NAACP’s historical research efforts in Brown, rejected the optimistic
portrait of Reconstruction and the Fourteenth Amendment put forth
in the NAACP’s brief, instead describing the legal achievements of the
period as “lacking in clarity, ambivalent in purpose, and capable of
numerous interpretations.”126 Modern racial progressives offer their
own version of Reconstruction pessimism, centered on the unbending
force of white supremacy that operates to snuff out egalitarian
impulses of the period. The recent 1619 Project offers a vivid example
of this progressive variant.127 According to Reconstruction pessimists,
the legal achievements of Reconstruction, while significant efforts to
break from the past, were ultimately too limited, too threatening to
white control of the levers of power, and hence destined to fail.128
In its modern, progressive version, the tragic heroes of this story
are the freedpeople who demanded their rights and then fought and
sacrificed, often with their lives, to make them a reality. But the people
who ultimately dictated the course of history were the unrepentant
Confederates who lurked in the shadows of the early years of Reconstruction, awaiting their moment to reassert themselves and their white
supremacist commitments, deploying intimidation and violence to
wrest control of southern governance from black Americans and their
124 See, e.g., Ulrich B. Phillips, The Central Theme of Southern History, 34 AM. HIST. REV.
30, 31 (1928) (describing the central theme of southern history as ensuring the South “shall
be and remain a white man’s country”).
125 See, e.g., MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE (1974); Michael Les
Benedict, Preserving the Constitution: The Conservative Basis of Radical Reconstruction, 61 J. AM.
HIST. 65 (1974).
126 C. VANN WOODWARD, Seeds of Failure in Radical Race Policy, in AMERICAN
COUNTERPOINT: SLAVERY AND RACISM IN THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE 163, 168 (1971).
127 See, e.g., Nikole Hannah-Jones, The 1619 Project: Our Founding Ideals of Liberty and
Equality Were False When They Were Written. Black Americans Fought to Make Them True, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Aug. 18, 2019, at 14, 21 (describing Reconstruction as a “fleeting moment,”
whose achievements were quickly undercut by white southern resistance and federal
government apathy—all evidence of how “[a]nti-black racism runs in the very DNA of this
country”). As Adam Serwer has written, the vision of American history at the heart of the
1619 Project is “a kind of pessimism, not about black struggle but about the sincerity and
viability of white anti-racism.” Adam Serwer, The Fight over the 1619 Project Is Not About the
Facts, ATLANTIC (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/12
/historians-clash-1619-project/604093/ [https://perma.cc/LB5R-M3R6].
128 See Hannah-Jones, supra note 127, at 21.
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white allies. The Supreme Court also features prominently in this
historiography as the institution that narrowed or closed down the
egalitarian impulses contained in the Reconstruction amendments
and legislation.
The tension between these two accounts allows for a dramatic
account of Reconstruction, in which we have a war of diametrically
opposed ideologies. As Laura Edwards has recently summarized
Reconstruction historiography: “The demands of the present weigh so
heavily on this particular period that the literature veers wildly between
hope and despair, a situation that says as much about historians’
concerns with law and government now as it does about their
involvement in the past.”129 The history of Brown was but one
particularly dramatic and consequential moment in which Americans
battled over the meaning of Reconstruction, crafting narratives of
hope and despair, all in an effort to respond to the demands of their
contested present.
CONCLUSION: THE AMBIGUITIES AND POSSIBILITIES OF HISTORY
The task of locating meaning in the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment necessitates certain choices. The Justices of the Brown
Court, the members of the NAACP’s legal team, and the others who
took part in the historical research project that emerged from the
Brown litigation all confronted these choices. They had to decide on
the appropriate timeframe for their historical inquiry. They had to
determine the relevant sources and assess their reliability and value.
They had to decide how much to generalize from the particularities of
the historical moment when describing the ideological commitments
of past historical actors. And lurking behind all these choices is a
question of what to do with the ambiguities of history that present
themselves at every turn.
How one approaches these ambiguities in the historical record is
conditioned by professional training and perspective. Historians, Jack
Rakove has noted, “can rest content with—even revel in—the ambiguities of the evidentiary record, recognizing that behind the textual
brevity of any clause there once lay a spectrum of complex views and
different shadings of opinion.”130 For historians the goal of understanding the past is an end of itself. Lawyers, by contrast, often treat
the ambiguities of history as puzzles to be solved. This was the
approach of the NAACP lawyers in the summer and fall of 1953 when
faced with the Supreme Court’s questions for reargument in Brown.
129
130

EDWARDS, supra note 11, at 174.
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 9–10 (1996).
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And it is the approach of recent generations of legal scholars who have
searched Reconstruction history for the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. For these lawyers, understanding history is a means to an
end, the end being to use history to give authority to legal
interpretation.
In practice, the line between the historical work of historians and
lawyers can be cloudy, as shown in the experience of the historians who
worked with the NAACP in Brown. The historian, C. Vann Woodward
insisted, “has obligations to the present as well as to the past he
studies.”131 Historians often search for a usable past as a way to explain
the present and advocate for a better future. And lawyers and judges
do, sometimes, accept the ambiguities of the historical record. This
was basically what the Justice Department did in its brief on
reargument in Brown when it declared the historical record on the
question at hand “inconclusive,” and it is of course what Chief Justice
Warren did when he echoed this conclusion in the Brown opinion,
writing that a review of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment,
“convince[s] us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not
enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they
are inconclusive.”132 The Court, Chief Justice Warren insisted, had to
face the problem of segregated schools in 1954 squarely.
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to
1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when
Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education
in the light of its full development and its present place in American
life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined
if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal
protection of the laws.133

The proud ahistoricism of Brown is one of its most remarkable
characteristics, all the more remarkable because history and historical
analysis played such a prominent role in the litigation process leading
up to the decision.
At the time, many celebrated Brown as a triumph of the present
over the past. Justice Reed, the most reluctant of the Justices to join
Chief Justice Warren’s opinion, described his reasoning in a letter to
Justice Frankfurter shortly after the decision was announced. “[T]he
factors looking toward a fair treatment for Negroes,” he explained,
“are more important than the weight of history.”134 A sense of relief
131 WOODWARD, supra note 27, at 98.
132 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
133 Id. at 492–93.
134 Letter from Stanley Reed to Felix Frankfurter (May 21, 1954) (on file with FFPHLS, supra note 20, at Part II, School Desegregation Cases and Legislative History of the
Fourteenth Amendment in the 39th Congress, Box 72, Folders 6–14, Page 406) (ProQuest).
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that the Court was able to extricate itself from historical constraints was
also found outside the Court. “It is futile to make war ‘to keep the past
upon its throne,’” wrote Harvard Law School professor Charles
Fairman in praising the Court’s decision.135 Edmond Cahn of New
York University Law School effused: “Never was Thomas Jefferson
more clearly vindicated in his insistence that the Constitution belongs
to the living generation of Americans.”136
Others in later generations have taken a different view of the
Court’s turn from history. Robert Bork lamented the Court’s dismissal
of history in Brown as having “a calamitous effect upon the law.”137 By
rejecting the constraints of original meaning (which Bork believed
justified the holding in Brown), and by being celebrated for doing so,
the Court came to see itself, according to Bork, as “virtually
invulnerable.”138 The Court’s unwillingness in Brown to engage with
the history of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment showed that
the “Court can do what it wishes, and there is almost no way to stop it,
provided its result has a significant political constituency.”139
Bork’s critique of the Brown Court for being too quick to push the
history of Reconstruction aside has merit, but not for the reason he
identifies. The belief that anchoring constitutional interpretation to
the attitudes, commitments, and actions of past generations serves to
effectively constrain judicial authority140 is premised on a flawed
understanding of the nature of history. Although history is built on a
bedrock of facts about the past that is largely stable, historical understanding requires interpretive decisions about what to do with these
facts. The deeper one delves into the world of the past, the more of
these interpretive decisions one must make. For those who seek in
history some sort of guidance for the present, what emerges is not
constraint but choices. Historical inquiry, when done well, is more
likely to multiply interpretive options than to reduce them.141

135 Charles Fairman, The Supreme Court, 1955 Term—Foreword: The Attack on the
Segregation Cases, 70 HARV. L. REV. 83, 94 (1956).
136 Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 152 (1955).
137 BORK, supra note 110, at 76.
138 Id. at 77.
139 Id.
140 The most prominent proponent of this defense of originalism was Justice Antonin
Scalia. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863–64
(1989) (describing “the main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution” as
judges who “mistake their own predilections for the law” and defending originalism
because it “establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the
preferences of the judge himself”).
141 See Sarah A. Seo, User’s Guide to History, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MODERN LEGAL
REALISM 464, 476–72 (Shauhin Talesh, Elizabeth Mertz & Heinz Klug eds., 2021).
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Despite the best efforts of originalists to make Brown their own,
the decision still does more to highlight originalism’s limitations than
its purported value. The approach to originalism that at the time of
Brown most scholars and most members of the Court treated as
orthodox centered on the intentions of the Constitution’s Framers
toward the relevant issue. This approach has the benefit of narrowing
the scope of historical inquiry in a way that may produce determinate
historical findings. And these findings may, if conscientiously applied
as a method of constitutional interpretation, operate to constrain
courts in the way that Bork envisioned.142 But there are at least two
major problems with this approach. One is Brown. This version of
originalism produces the wrong outcome in Brown. The weight of
historical evidence indicates that the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not believe that it would have the effect of prohibiting
racial segregation in schools. The other problem is that this approach
to originalism—one focused on the minds of a small group of elite
lawmakers and how they expected new constitutional provisions to be
applied—has been displaced by more robust and more defensible
versions of originalism. The focus of modern originalist analysis is on
the original meaning of constitutional text to the people at the time in
which the text was added to the Constitution.143 This approach shifts
attention toward broader principles embodied in the constitutional
text. It also allows for a much wider cast of historical actors to contribute to the meaning of the Constitution. But once we make this move,
once we bring into the conversation the claims expressed in
conventions of freedpeople, the rumblings of defiant Confederates,
the murmurs of fearful moderates, the silence (to history at least) of
countless others, we are left with a rich, passionate cacophony of voices
that hardly produces the determinate facts that can direct future
judges that the text of the Fourteenth Amendment must be
interpreted a particular way. The deeper we engage with the historical
record, the less effectively history constrains constitutional
interpretation. History does not produce the clear, stable answers that
Bork and other originalists claim to find—it did not do so in Brown,
and it does not do so with regard to the most pressing questions of
constitutional interpretation that we bring to the Reconstruction
Amendments.

142 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint Principle: Original Meaning and
Constitutional Practice (Apr. 3, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2940215.
143 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Theory and Precedent: A Public Meaning
Approach, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 451 (2018) (reviewing RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS
RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT (2017)).
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The members of the Brown Court went too far, however, in
pushing aside the record of Reconstruction as grounds for their ruling.
The Court’s opinion famously struggled to locate adequate footing for
its legal reasoning. Chief Justice Warren turned away from 1866. He
also turned away from 1896 and the sordid history of white supremacy
and black oppression during the Jim Crow Era.144 He was left with an
argument about the changed place of public education in midtwentieth-century American life and claims about the damages statemandated racial segregation inflicts on black children—not the most
solid of foundations for a Court ruling, and certainly not one of
Brown’s significance. The Justices came to terms with the limitations
of the historical record of Reconstruction, but in their eagerness to get
beyond what they assumed was nothing but an obstacle to a desegregation ruling, they failed to recognize the possibilities of this historical
record.
For it is the generative possibilities of this history that is the most
obvious change in how historians and legal scholars approach
Reconstruction as compared to the mid-twentieth century. The idea
of what constitutes the proper sources for understanding the
constitutional transformations of Reconstruction has dramatically
expanded. Most notably, black Americans have a far more prominent
role in this history, and historians have pushed a more decentralized,
bottom-up story of constitutional transformation.145 To demand that
history give us the one correct way to interpret the Fourteenth
Amendment diminishes the complex, variegated, often contradictory
and ambiguous historical record. But this does not mean that our
efforts to apply the Fourteenth Amendment require pushing aside its
history. Rather, it means exploring the struggles and ambiguities of
the past and using these past experiences to inform our present-day
choices. History may be limited as a constraint on constitutional
interpretation, but it can provide illumination to help guide us on our
way.

144 Charles Black’s famous article defending Brown urges a more direct confrontation
with this aspect of the historical record. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation
Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424–25 (1960).
145 See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 11, at 175 (“To the extent that national legal
principles emerged during Reconstruction, they owed as much to the various efforts of
diverse groups of people working in localized contexts as they did to federal policy.”); KATE
MASUR, UNTIL JUSTICE BE DONE: AMERICA’S FIRST CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO RECONSTRUCTION xvi (locating the Fourteenth Amendment as the
“culmination of a decades-long movement” for racial equality led by black and white
activists in the northern states).

